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CONCLUSION
Behavioral decision theory has two interrelated facets, normative and
descriptive. The normative theory is concerned with prescribing courses
of action that conform most closely to the decision maker's beliefs and
values. Describing these beliefs and values and the manner in which indi
viduals incorporate them into their decisions is the aim of descriptive
decision theory.
This review is organized around these two facets. The first
section deals with descriptive studies of judgment, inference and choice;
the second section discusses the development of decision~aiding techniques.
As we reviewed the literature, several trends caught our attention.
One is that decision making is being studied by researchers from an in
creasingly diverse set of disciplines, including medicine, economics,
education, political science, geography, engineering, marketing, and
management science, as well as psychology. Nevertheless, the importance
This is the fourth survey of this topic to appear in the Annual Review.
Its predecessors were articles by Edwards Cl8)» Becker & McClintock (24),
and Rapoport & Wallsten (2,2,6). The present review covers publications
appearing between Jan. 1, 1971, and Dec. 31, 1975, with occasional exceptions.
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of psychological concepts is increasing, in both the normative and descrip
tive work. Whereas past descriptive studies consisted mainly of rather
superficial comparisons between actual behavior and normative models, re
search now focuses on the psychological underpinnings of observed
behavior. Likewise, the prescriptive enterprise is being psychologized
by challenges to the acceptability of the fundamental axioms of utility
theory (1*0, ISfc, ZS4»).
Second, increasing effort is being devoted to the development of
practical methods for helping people cope with uncertainty. Here, psy
chological research provides guidance about how to elicit the judgments
needed for decision-aiding techniques.
Third, the field is growing rapidly, as evidenced by the numerous
reviews and bibliographies produced during the past five years. Slovic &
Lichtenstein (254) reviewed the literature on Bayesian and regression
approaches to studying information processing in decision making and judg
ment; Dillon (73) covered utility theory with a view towards its application
in agricultural contexts; MacCrimmon (187) examined work in management
decision making; Shulman & Elstein (2f7) discussed the implications of
judgment and decision making research for teachers; Nickerson & Feehrer (20^)
searched for studies relevant to the training of decision makers (since
there aren't many, they settled for a general review); Vlek & Wagenaar (2-52*)
surveyed the entire field and Kozielecki (157) and Lee (I&5) have provided
its first textbooks.
A selective and annotated bibliography on Behavioral Decision Theory
has been compiled by Barron (18). Kusyszyn (Ifcl, l(»2) has provided biblio
graphies covering the psychology of gambling, risk-taking, and subjective
probability. Houle (IZ*f) has accumulated a massive bibliography on Bayesian
statistics and related behavioral work, which by 1975 included 106 special
ized books, 1322 journal articles, and about 800 other publications. By
the time you read this, Kleiter, Gachowetz & Huber (153) will have assembled
the most complete bibliography ever in this field. They generously supplied
us with more than 1000 relevant references, all produced between 1971 and 1975.
To ease cognitive strain (and stay within sight of our page allotment),
we have focused on psychological aspects of individual judgment and
decision making. Thus, we omit group and organizational decision making,
Bayesian statistics, and much of the work on the axiomatic formulations
of decision theory. Game theory is reviewed elsewhere in this volume.
Even with this narrow focus, we have had to limit our coverage severely,
concentrating on those references to which our prejudices have led us.
DESCRIPTIVE RESEARCH
Probabilistic Judgment
Because of the importance of probabilistic reasoning to decision
making, considerable effort has been devoted to studying how people perceive,
process and evaluate the probabilities of uncertain events. Early research
on "intuitive statistics" led Peterson & Beach (ZI&) to an optimistic
conclusion:
. . . man gambles well. He survives and prospers while using . . .
fallible information to infer the states of his uncertain environment
and to predict future events ( p. 29).
Experiments that have compared human inferences with those of
statistical man show that the normative model provides a good first
approximation for a psychological theory of inference. Inferences
made by subjects are influenced by appropriate variables in appropriate
directions (pp. 42-43).
MODEL-BASED PARADIGMS One result of this high regard for our intellectual
capability has been a reliance on normative models in descriptive
research. Thus, Barclay, Beach & Braithwaite (/5) proposed beginning with
a normative model and adjusting its form or parameters to produee a descrip
tive model. This approach is best exemplified by the study of conservatism—
the tendency, when integrating probabilistic information, to produce
posterior probabilities smaller than those specified by Bayes1 theorem.
In 1971, conservatism was identified as the primary finding of Bayesian
information integration research (25^). Reports of the phenomenon have
continued to appear, in tasks involving normally distributed populations
( 7<5, 274,345), and in that old favorite, the binomial (bookbag and poker
chip) task (3, l*?6). Even filling the bookbags with male and female
Polish surnames fails to lessen the effect (262.). Donnell & DuCharmefs (75)
subjects became optimal when told the normative response, but when the
task changed, their learning failed to generalize. As the next section
shows, conservatism occurs only in certain kinds of inference tasks. In a
variety of other settings, people's inferences are too extreme.
Cascaded inference Real-life problems often have several stages, with
inferences at each stage relying on data which are themselves inferences
from unreliable observations or reports. For example, a physician who uses
the condition of the patient's lungs as a cue for diagnosis must first infer
that condition from unreliable data (e.g., the sound of a thumped chest).
Several normative models for such cascaded or multi-stage inference tasks
have been developed in recent years (2l7> 23$)• Schum (23^) has shown
the relevance of cascaded inference models to the judicial problem of
witness credibility and the probative value of witness testimony.
Descriptive studies of cascaded inference, comparing subjects'
responses in the laboratory with a normative model, have consistently shown
a result just the opposite of conservatism: subjects' posterior probabili
ties are more extreme than those prescribed by the model (100, ZH > Z6fc). The
extremity of subjects' responses has been traced to their use of a simple,
but inappropriate, "best-guess" strategy (/03, 137, 257, 266), which is
insensitive to data unreliability.
HEURISTICS AND BIASES
In these recent studies of conservatism and cascaded inference, one
can see an increasing skepticism about the normative model's ability to
fulfill its descriptive role, and the view of humans as good intuitive
statisticians is no longer paramount. A psychological Rip van Winkle who
dozed off after reading Peterson & Beach (218) and roused himself only
recently would be startled by the widespread change of attitude exemplified
by statements such as "In his evaluation of evidence, man is apparently
not a conservative Bayesian: he is not Bayesian at all" (138, p. 450),
or ". . . man's cognitive capacities are not adequate for the tasks which
confront him" (II**, p. 4), or ". . . people systematically violate the
principles of rational decision making when judging probabilities, making
predictions, or otherwise attempting to cope with probabilistic tasks"
(252, p. ).
Van Winkle would be further surprised to see Hammond (//*£) and Dawes
(£?) putting information-processing deficiencies on a par with motivational
conflicts as causes of the ills that plague humanity, and to see financial
analysts, accountants, geographers, statisticians and others being briefed
on the implications of these intellectual shortcomings ( IH ,121a, ZHQ, 2*/f,
253, 282).
In 1971, when reviewing the literature on probabilistic inference,
Slovic & Lichtenstein (25^0 found only a handful of studies that looked
at subjects' information-processing heuristics. Since then, rather than
simply comparing behavior with normative models, almost every descriptive
study of probabilistic thinking has attempted to determine how the underlying
cognitive processes are molded by the interaction between the demands of
the task and the limitations of the thinker.
Much of the impetus for this change can be attributed to Tversky &
Kahneman's (/38, 13^ , 23*f, 285, 286) demonstrations of three judgmental
heuristics, representativeness, availability and anchoring, which determine
probabilistic judgments in a variety of tasks. Although always efficient,
and at times valid, these heuristics can lead to biases that are large,
persistent, and serious in their implications for decision making.
Judgment by representativeness What is the probability that object B belongs
to class A? Or, what is the probability that process A will generate event B?
Kahneman & Tversky (/38) hypothesized that people answer such questions by
examining the essential features of A and of B and assessing the degree of
similarity between them, the degree to which B is "representative" of A.
When B is very similar to A, as when an outcome is highly representative
of the process from which it originates, then its probability is judged to
be high.
Several lines of evidence support this hypothesis. Tversky & Kahneman
(ZQH) demonstrated a belief in what they called "the law of small numbers"
whereby even small samples are viewed as highly representative of the popula-
tions from which they are drawn. This belief led their subjects, research
psychologists, to underestimate the error and unreliability inherent in
small samples of data. Kahneman & Tversky (/38) showed that both subjective
sampling distributions and posterior probability estimates were insensitive
to sample size, a normatively important but psychologically non-representative
factor. In a subsequent paper, Kahneman & Tversky (13?) demonstrated
that people's intuitive predictions violate normative principles in ways
that can be attributed to representativeness biases. For one, representa
tiveness causes prior probabilities to be neglected. For another, predictions
tend not to be properly regressive, being insensitive to considerations of
data reliability.
Judgment by availability Other judgmental biases are due to use of the
"availability" heuristic (285) whereby an event is judged likely or frequent
if it is easy to imagine or recall relevant instances. In life, instances
of frequent events are typically easier to recall than instances of less
frequent events, and likely occurrences are usually easier to imagine than
unlikely ones. Thus, availability is often a valid cue for the assessment of
frequency and probability. However, since availability is also affected
by subtle factors unrelated to likelihood, such as familiarity, recency,
and emotional saliency, reliance on it may result in systematic biases.
Judgment by adjustment Another error-prone heuristic is "anchoring and
adjustment." With this process, a natural starting point or anchor is used
as a first approximation to the judgment. The anchor is then adjusted
to accommodate the implications of additional information. Typically, the
adjustment is imprecise and insufficient (2¥8). Tversky & Kahneman (286)
showed how anchoring and adjustment could cause the overly narrow confidence
intervals found by many investigators (175) and the tendency to misjudge
the probability of conjunctive and disjunctive events (/6, 57, 517).
Related work Numerous studies have replicated and extended the Kahneman &
Tversky studies, and others have independently arrived at similar conclusions.
The representativeness heuristic has received the most attention.
Wise & Mockovak (3IO), Bar-Hillel 07), and Teigen (278, 27^) have documented
the importance of similarity structures in probability judgment. Like
Kahneman & Tversky (138), Marks & Clarkson (/9J , /9Z) and Svenson (27/) observed
that subjects' posterior probabilities in binomial bookbag and pdker chip
tasks were predominantly influenced by the most representative aspect of
the sample, the proportion of red chips. Contrary to the normative model,
population proportion and sample size were relatively unimportant. Leon &
Anderson (/66) did find an influence of these two characteristics and, as
a result, claimed that Kahneman & Tversky's subjects must have misunderstood
the task. Ward (3©2), however, argued that the conflicting results were
most likely due to differences in the tasks, rather than to misinterpretation
of instructions. Hammerton (//3), Lyon & Slovic (184), Nisbett & Borgida (210),
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and Borgida & Nisbett have replicated Kahneman & Tversky's finding that
subjects neglect population base rates when judging the probability that an
individual belongs to a given category. Nisbett & Borgida argued that this
neglect stems in part from the abstract, pallid, statistical character of
base-rate information. They found that concrete, case-specific information,
even from a sample of one, may have much greater importance, a rather dramatic
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Borgida, E. & Nisbett, R. E. Abstract vs. concrete information: The senses
engulf the mind, unpublished, University of Michigan, 1976.
illustration of the law of small numbers. Additional evidence for representa
tiveness comes from studies by Brickman & Pierce (^5), Holzworth & Doherty (/23),
Bauer (20, 21 ) and Lichtenstein, Earle & Slovic 073).
Availability and anchoring have been studied less often. Evidence of
3
availability bias has been found by Borgida & Nisbett and Slovic, Fischhoff
& Lichtenstein (252). Anchoring has been hypothesized to account for the
effects of response mode upon bet preferences (/76, /77) and it has been
proposed as a method that people use to reduce strain when making ratio
judgments (/o6). Pitz (2/?) gave the anchoring heuristic a key role in
his model describing how people create subjective probability distributions
for imperfectly known (uncertain) quantities.
Overconf idence The evidence presented above suggests that the heuristic
selected, the way it is employed and the accuracy of the judgment it produces
are all highly problem-specific; they may even vary with different represen
tations of the same problem. Indeed, heuristics may be faulted as a general
theory of judgment because of the difficulty of knowing which will be
applied in any particular instance.
There is, however, one fairly valid generalization that may be derived
from this literature. Except for some Bayesian inference tasks, people
tend to be overconfident in their judgments. This may be seen in their
non-regressive predictions (13?), in their disregafd for the extent of the
data base upon which their judgments rest (158), or its reliability (ZiJ), and
in the miscalibration of their probabilities for discrete and continuous
propositions (/75). Howell (128) has repeatedly shown that people overestimate
their own abilities on tasks requiring skill (e.g., throwing darts). Langer
(/63) dubbed this effect "the illusion of control" and demonstrated that
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it can be induced by introducing skill factors (such as competition and
choice) into chance situations.
In a task that had people estimate the odds that they had been able
to select the correct answer to general knowledge questions, Slovic, Fisch
hoff & Lichtenstein (254) found that wrong answers were often given with
certainty. Furthermore, subjects had sufficient faith in their odds that
they were willing to participate in a gambling game that punished them
severely for their overconfidence.
How do we maintain this overconfidence? One possibility is that
the environment is often not structured to show our limits. Many decisions
we make are quite insensitive to errors in estimating what we want (utilities)
or what's going to happen (probabilities)—so that errors in estimation
are hard to detect (2$^a). Sometimes we receive no feedback at all. Even
when we do, we may distort its meaning to exaggerate our judgmental prowess,
perhaps convincing ourselves that the outcome we got was what we really
wanted. Langer & Roth (/6¥) found that subjects who experienced initial
successes in a repetitive task overremembered their own past successes.
Fischhoff & Beyth (93) found that people asked to recall their own predictions
about past events remembered having assigned higher probabilities to events
that later occurred than was actually the case. Fischhoff (8f) also
found that people (a) overestimate the extent to which they would have
been able to predict past events had they been asked to do so, and (b) exag
gerate the extent to which others should have been able to predict past
events* These hindsight biases are further evidence of overconfidence for
they show that people have inordinately high opinions of their own predic
tive abilities,
ities.
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Descriptive theories Most of the research On heuristics and biases can
be considered pre-theoretical. It has documented the descriptive short
comings of the normative model and produced concepts such as representative
ness add anchoring that may serve as the basis for new descriptive theories.
Although theory development has been limited thus far, efforts by Wallsten
(300, 3d) and Shanteau (2¥3, z¥4) to produce descriptive algebraic models
are noteworthy. Shanteau's approach is based upon the averaging model of
Anderson's integration theory (7). Wallsten's model, formulated and tested
within the framework of conjoint measurement, assumes that limited capacity
causes people to process dimensions of information sequentially and weight
them differentially, according to their salience.
Choice
In their introduction to two volumes on contemporary developments in
methematical psychology, Krantz, et al (159) explained their exclusion of
the entire area of preferential choice as follows:
There is no lack whatever of technically excellent papers in this
area but they give no sense of any real cumulation of knowledge.
What are established laws of preferential choice behavior? (Since
three of the editors have worked in this area, our attitude may reflect
some measure of our own frustration). (p. xii)
This sense of frustration is understandable when one reviews recent
research on choice. The field is in a state of transition, moving
away from the assumption that choice probability is expressable as a mono
tone function of the scale values or utilities of the alternatives. Present
efforts are aimed at developing more detailed, molecular concepts, that
12
describe choice in terms of information-processing phenomena. Researchers
appear to be searching for heuristics or modes of processing information
that are common to a wide domain of subjects and choice problems. However,
they are finding that the nature of the task is a prime determinant of
the observed behavior.
ELIMINATION BY ASPECTS One major new choice theory is Tversky's
(280, 281) ellmination-by-aspects (EBA) model. The model describes choice
as a covert sequential elimination process. Alternatives are viewed as
sets of aspects (e.g., cars described by price, model, color, etc.). At
each stage in the choice process an aspect is selected with probability
proportional to its importance; alternatives that are unsatisfactory on
the selected aspect are eliminated. Tversky showed that the EBA model
generalizes the models of Luce (/83) and Restle (220) while avoiding some
of the counter-examples to which these earlier models are susceptible.
Searching §or even broader applicability, Corbin & Marley (LZ) proposed
a random utility model that includes the EBA model as a special case. Other
models built around the concept of successive elimination of alternatives
have been developed by Hogarth (/2|) IZZ) and Pollay (220).
PROCESS DESCRIPTION Most recent empirical research has been concerned
with describing the decision maker's methods for processing information
before choosing. Whereas earlier work focused on external products (e.g.,
choice proportions and rankings) and used rather simple methods, process-
descriptive studies must employ more complex procedures for
collecting and analyzing data. Thus, we find a return to introspective
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methods (28, 1*?^, 272) in which subjects are asked to think aloud as they
choose among various multiattribute alternatives. Bettman & Jacoby (31)
and Payne (2Hf) supplemented the think-aloud procedure by requiring subjects
to seek information from envelopes on an "information board." Russo &
Rosen (231) used eye-movement data conjointly with verbal protocols. One
goal of these studies is to represent the choice process graphically as
a tree or network (discrimination net) of successive decisions. Swinth,
Gaumnitz & Rodriguez (275) developed a method of controlled introspection
that enables subjects to build and validate their own discrimination nets.
Bettman (27) showed how to describe such nets via graph-theoretical concepts,
Uneasy about the subjectivity of introspective techniques, Hogarth (121 )
used an ingenious blend of theory and empiricism to develop a computer al
gorithm that builds the tree without recourse to subjective inputs.
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Can introspective methods be trusted? Nisbett & Wilson reopened an
old debate by arguing that people lack awareness of the factors that affect
their judgments. After documenting this claim with results from six exper
iments, they concluded that "Investigators who are inclined to place them
selves at the mercy of such [introspective] reports . . . would be better
advised to remain in the armchair" (p. 35). While important, this criticism
may be overstated. Students of choice have in many instances validated
their introspective reports against theoretical predictions (111) and data
from other sources (2J*f, Footnote 5).
What do these methodologies tell us about choice? First they indicate
that subjects use many rules and strategies enroute to a decision. These
Nisbett, R. E. & Wilson, T. D. Awareness of factors influencing one's own
evaluations, judgments, and behavior, unpublished, University of Michigan, 1976,
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include conjunctive, disjunctive, lexicographic and compensatory rules
and the principle of dominance (21H-). A typical choice may involve several
stages, utilizing different rules at different junctures. Early in the
process, subjects tend to compare a number of alternatives on the same
attribute and use conjunctive rules to reject some alternatives from
further consideration (26, 2i4, 2^5,272). Later they appear to employ
compensatory weighting of advantages and disadvantages on the reduced set
of alternatives (2l4). Features of the task that complicate the decision,,
such as incomplete data, incommensurable data dimensions, information over
load, time pressures and many alternatives seem to encourage strain-
reducing, noncompensatory strategies (ZlH, 255, 313, 3/^). Svenson (272)
and Russo & Rosen (231) found subjects reducing memory load by comparing
two alternatives at a time and retaining only the better one for later
5
comparisons. Russo & Dosher observed simple strategies, such as counting
the number of dimensions favoring each alternative or ignoring small dif
ferences between alternatives on a particular dimension. In some instances,
these strategies led to sub-optimal choices.
In general, people appear to prefer strategies that are easy to
justify and don't involve reliance on relative weights, trade-off functions
or other numerical computations. One implication of this was noted by
Slovic (25c), whose subjects were forced to choose among pairs of alternatives
that were equal in value for them. Rather than choose randomly, subjects
consistently followed the easy and defensible strategy of selecting the
Russo, J. E. & Dosher, B. A. Dimensional Evaluation: A heuristic for
binary choice, unpublished, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1975.
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alternative that was superior on the more important dimension.
SCRIPT PROCESSING Abelson's ([) new approach to explaining decisions
warrants further study. It is based on the concept of a "cognitive script,"
which is a coherent sequence of events expected by the individual on the
basis of prior learning or experience. When faced with a decision, indivi
duals are hypothesized to bring relevant scripts into play. For example,
Candidate Y's application for graduate school may be rejected because Y
reminds the decision maker of Candidate X who was accepted and failed
miserably. Another script might assimilate the candidate into a category
(He's one of those shy types who does well in courses, but doesn't have
enough initiative in research). Script theory, though still in a highly
speculative stage, suggests a type of explanation for choice that has thus
far been overlooked.
CONSUMER CHOICE Much research on choice has been done within the domain
of consumer psychology. Comprehensive reviews of this research have been
provided by Jacoby (/3^, 135). Although some of this work is application
of multiple regression, conjoint measurement, and analysis of variance to
describe consumers' values (30, 101 ,3/2), many other studies have investi
gated basic psychological questions. For example, one major issue has
been the effect of amount and display of information on the optimality of
choice. Jacoby and his colleagues have argued that more information is
not necessarily helpful, as it can overload consumers and lead them to select
sub-optimal products. Russo, Krieser & Miyashita (230) observed that
subjects had great difficulty finding the most economical product among
16
an array of different prices and packages. Even unit prices, which do the
arithmetic for the consumer, had little effect on; buyer behavior when
posted on the shelf below each product. However, when prices per unit were
listed In order from high to low cost, shoppers began to buy less expensive
products.
Models of Risky Choice
Decision making under conditions of risk has been studied extensively.
This is probably due to the availability of (a) an appealing research
paradigm, choices among gambles, and (b) a dominant normative theory,
the subjectively expected utility (SEU) model, against which behavior can
be compared. The SEU model assumes that people behave as though they
maximized the sum of the products of utility and probability.
Early studies of the model's descriptive adequacy produced conflicting
results. Situational and task parameters were found to have strong effects,
leading Rapoport AaWallsten (226) to observe that a researcher might accept
SEU with one set of bets and reject it with another, differently structured
set. Proponents of the SEU model point out that it gives a good global
fit to choice data, particularly for simple gambles. In addition, certain
assumptions of the model, like the independent (multiplicative) combination
of probabilities and payoffs, have been verified for simple gambles (2*P/, 2*?9)
However, during the past five years, the proponents of SEU have been
greatly outnumbered by its critics. Coombs (60) has argued that risky
choice is determined not by SEU, but by a compromise between maximization
Goodman, B., Saltzman, M., Edwards, W. & Krantz, D. Prediction of bids for
two-outcome gambles in a casino setting, unpublished, 1976.
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of expected value (EV) and optimization of risk. He proposed an alternative
to SEU, "portfolio theory," in which risk preferences play a central role.
That role is illustrated in a study by Coombs & Huang (60 in which a gamble,
B, was constructed as a probability mixture of two other gambles, A and C.
Many subjects preferred gamble B (with its intermediate risk level) to gam
bles A and C, thus violating a fundamental axiom of SEU theory.
Zagorski (318) demonstrated a result that appears to violate SEU
and many other algebraic models as well. Zagorski's subjects were shown
pairs of gambles (A, B) and were asked to judge the amount of money (A-B)
that would induce them to trade the better gamble (A) for the worse
gamble (B). He demonstrated that one can construct quadruples of gambles
A, B, C and D such that
(A-B) + (B-C) ^ (A-D) + (D-C) .
In other words, path independence is violated. The difference between
gambles A and C depends on whether the intermediate gamble is B or D.
A favorite approach of SEU critics is to develop counterexamples to
the fundamental axioms of the theory. The paradoxes of Allais (#) and
Ellsberg (85) are two of the most famous, both designed to invalidate
Savage's (232) independence principle. Until recently, few theor
ists were convinced. MacCrimmon (/85) showed that business executives
who violated various axioms could easily be led, via discussion, to see
the error of their ways. However, Slovic & Tversky (256) challenged
MacCrimmon's discussion procedure on the grounds that it pressured the
subjects to accept the axioms. They presented subjects with arguments
for and against the independence axiom and found persistent violations,
even after the axiom was presented in a clear and presumably compelling
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fashion. Moskowitz (2oo) used a variety of problem representations (matrix
formats, trees, and verbal presentations) to clarify the principle and
maximize its acceptability, yet still found that the independence axiom
was rejected. Even MacCrimmon's faith in many of the key axioms has been
shaken by recent data (see 188), leading him to suggest that reevaluation
of the theory is in order.
Kahneman & Tversky (MO, 283) attempted this sort of reevaluation,
presenting evidence for two pervasive violations of SEU theory. One,
the "certainty effect," causes consequences that are obtained with certainty
to be valued more than uncertain consequences. The Allais paradox may
be due to this effect. The second, labeled the "reference effect," leads
people to evaluate alternatives relative to a reference point corresponding
to their status quo, adaptation level, or expectation. By altering the
reference point, formally equivalent versions of the same decision problem
may elicit different preferences. These effects pose serious problems for
the normative theory and its application.
Payne (2.13) proposed replacing the SEU model with information processing
theories that describe how probabilities and payoffs are integrated into
decisions. He presented a "contingent process" model to describe the
sequential processes involved in choice among gambles. For support,
he cited a number of display and response-mode effects that are due to
processing difficulties (/7A, /77, ffl, 2/S). Kozielecki's (t5S) discussion
of the internal representation of risky tasks carried a similar message.
Kunreuther (l(fO) has argued that utility theory would be of little
value to a policy maker trying to predict how people would respond to
various flood or earthquake insurance programs. First, the theory makes
predictions that are not borne out by actual behavior—for example, that
19
people will prefer policies with high deductibles or that subsidizing
premiums will increase insurance purchasing. Second, it gives no guidance
about the social, situational and cognitive factors that are likely to
influence insurance purchase. Like Payne, Kunreuther called for an
alternative theory, founded on the psychology of human information processing,
and presented a model of his own to support his case.
Readers interested in additional attacks on the staggering SEU model
should consult Barron & MacKenzie (/?)» Davenport & Middleton (66), Fryback,
Goodman & Edwards (19), Ronen (22?), and Svenson (273).
Regression Approaches
The regression paradigm uses analysis of variance, conjoint measurement
and multiple regression techniques to develop algebraic
models that describe the method by which individuals weight and combine
information.
INTEGRATION THEORY Working within the framework of "information integration
theory," Anderson and his colleagues have shown that simple algebraic
models describe information use quite well In an Impressive variety of
judgmental, decisionmaking, attitudinal, and perceptual tasks (6, *J).
These models typically have revealed stimulus averaging, although some
subtracting and multiplying has been observed. Particularly relevant to
decision making are studies of risk taking and inference (2^), configura-
lity in clinical judgment (5), intuitive statistics (/67,/68), preference
for bus transportation (210a), and judgment in stud poker (181). There
is no doubt that algebraic models derived from Anderson's techniques
provide good surface descriptions of judgmental processes. However, as
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Graesser & Anderson (/06) have observed, establishment of an algebraic
model is only the first step towards disclosing the underlying cognitive
mechanisms, which may be rather different from the surface form of the
model.
POLICY CAPTURING Another form of the regression paradigm uses correlational
statistics to provide judgmental models in realistic settings. The most
systematic development of these procedures has been made by Hammond and
his colleagues (WJ) within "social judgment theory." This theory assumes
that most judgments depend upon a mode of thought that Is quasi-rational,
that is, a synthesis of analytic and intuitive processes. The elements
of quasi-rational thought are cues (attributes), their weights, and their
functional relationships (linear and non-linear) to both the environment
and the judge's responses. Brusnwik's lens model and multiple regression anal
ysis are used to derive equations representing the judge's cue utilization
policy. Judgmental performance is analyzed into knowledge and "cognitive con
trol," the latter being the ability to employ one's knowledge consistently (//8)
By 1971, it was evident that linear models could describe college
students' cue-weighting policies in a wide variety of laboratory tasks (25^).
During the past five years, such models have been used with similar success
to analyze complex real-world judgments. Judges in these studies have
included business managers (llf, i'M , Zol, Zo2), graduate admissions
committees (6£, 237), auditors, accountants, and loan officers (/3, /72,
3/5), military officers (277), literary critics (8*f), and trout hatchery
employees (/82), as they attempted to predict business failures and stock
market performance, select graduate students, plan work force and production
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schedules, evaluate accounting procedures, Air Force cadets, and theatrical
plays, and recommend trout streams. Even U.S. senators have been modeled
and their roll-call votes predicted (2*8). As in the laboratory studies,
linear equations have accounted for most of the predictable variance in
these complex judgments. The coefficients of these equations have provided
useful descriptions of the judges' cue™weighting policies and have pin
pointed the sources of inter-judge disagreement and non-optimal cue use.
While policies were being captured in the field, other researchers
were deepening our understanding of the models. Dawes & Corrigan (70)
observed that linear models have typically been applied in situations
in which (a) the predictor variables are monotonically related to the cri
terion (or can be easily rescaled to be monotonic), and (b) there is error
in the independent and dependent variables. They demonstrated that these
conditions insure good fits by linear models, regardless of whether the
weights in such models are optimal. Thus the linearity observed in judges'
behaviors may be reflecting only a characteristic of linear models, not
a characteristic of human judgment.
In other work, theoretical and methodological refinements of the lens
model have been developed by Castellan (52, 53) and Stenson (267). Cook
(5?) and Stewart & Carter (268) have worked towards developing interactive
computer programs for policy capturing. Mertz & Doherty (#5) and Brehmer
(37) examined the influence of various task characteristics on the configur-
ality and consistency of policies. Miller (117) demonstrated that improper
cue labels could mislead judges despite the availability of adequate
statistical information about cue validities. Lichtenstein, Earle & Slovic
073) and Birnbaum (32) showed that even though regression equations can
be used to describe cue-combination policies, subjects often average cues,
'.
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In violation of the additivity inherent in the equations. Wiggins (Zolo)
discussed the problems of identifying and characterizing individual
differences in judgmental policies and Ramanaiah & Goldberg (222) explored
the stability and correlates of such differences. McCann, Miller & Moskowitz
(193) examined the problems of capturing policies in particularly complex
and dynamic tasks such as production planning.
MULTIPLE CUE PROBABILITY LEARNING Considerable effort has been invested
in studying how people learn to make inferences from several probabilistic
cues. Most of this work goes under the label "multiple-cue probability
learning" (MCPL) and relies on the lens model for conceptual and analytic
guidance. Typically, the cues are numerical and vary in their importance
and in the form (linear or nonlinear) of their relationship to the criterion
being judged. The criterion usually contains error, making perfect predic
tion impossible. Because these tasks embody the essential features of
diagnostic inference, they are studied for their potential applied signi
ficance as well as their contributions to basic knowledge.
Slovic & Lichtenstein (25^) reviewed MCPL studies published prior to
1971. They concluded that: (a) subjects can learn to use linear cues
appropriately; (b) learning of nonlinear functions is slow, and especially
difficult when subjects are not forewarned that relations may be nonlinear;
(c) subjects are inconsistent, particularly when task predictability is
low; (d) subjects fail to take proper account of cue intercorrelations;
and (e) outcome feedback is not very helpful.
Research during the past half decade has confirmed and extended these
conclusions. Difficulties people have in coping with intercorrelated
cues have been documented in numerous studies (8, ^, 118, 236). Hammond
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and his colleagues (115) used the MCPL paradigm to analyze the effects of
psychoactive drugs on cognition. They found that some drugs that are used
to enhance emotional control interfered with learning and communication
in ways that may be detrimental to therapy. Bjorkman (33) and Castellan
(5^) reviewed results from studies using nonmetric cues and criteria.
Other research has worked towards developing a theory to explain
MCPL results in terms of erroneous intuitions about probabilistic tasks,
the manner in which individuals acquire and test hypotheses, and their
cognitive limitations. For example, Brehmer (38,¥0,W) has studied how
subjects formulate and test hypotheses as they search for rules that
will produce satisfactory inferences. Hypotheses about the functional
rule relating cues and criterion appear to be sampled from a hierarchical set
based on previous experience and dominated by the positive linear rule.
Testing of hypotheses about rules shows inadequate appreciation of the
probabilistic nature of the task. Subjects keep searching for deterministic
rules that will account for the randomness in the task; since there are
none, they change rules frequently (i.e., become inconsistent) and eventually
resample rules they had previously discarded.
Even when subjects are informed of the correct rules, they have trouble
applying them consistently (3/, HZ. , U6). Nonlinear rules are particularly
hard to apply. Brehmer, Hammond and their colleagues have thus conceptualized
inference as a skill analogous to motor behavior: with both, we can know
what we want to do without necessarily being able to do it.
Dynamic Decision Making
At the time of Rapoport & Wallsten's review, one active research
area was dynamic decision making (DDM), the study of tasks in which
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"decisions are made sequentially in time; the task specifications may
change over time, either independently or as a result of previous decisions;
information available for later decisions may be contingent upon the out-
comes of earlier decisions; and implications of any decision may reach into
the future" (22^, p. 345). The present half-decade began promisingly
with Rapoport & Burkheimer's (225) explication of formal models for deferred
decision making and the manner in which they might be utilized in psycholo
gical experiments. Shortly thereafter, Ebert (77) reported finding no dif
ference between stochastic and deterministic versions of a task which
Rapoport (223) earlier had found to differ. After that, relative silence.
Several possible reasons for this decline in interest come to mind.
The mathematical sophistication of DDM may deter some researchers, as may
the on-line computer and long start-up time often required. Furthermore,
DDM models are so complex and require so many assumptions that the interpre
tation of experimental results is typically ambiguous—witness the morass
of explanations facing Ebert (77) for why his experiment and Rapoport's
produced different results. Kleiter (/5/) noted particular problems with
creating cover stories that induce subjects to accept the assumptions under
lying the model and with ascertaining that subjects understood the task.
He also questioned "the metahypothesis that human behavior is optimal" (p 374),
which limits psychological theories to variations on the optimal model,
(e.g., using subjective probability estimates rather than "objec
tive" relative frequencies or assuming a reduced planning horizon).
In his own work, Kleiter (/52) has assessed people's planning horizons
and has used a non-normative variance-preference model to predict
betting behavior in a multistage game (15^). These predictions relied on
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the assumption that people were perfect Bayesian information processors.
A more active area of DDM research deals with sequential information
purchasing or sampling. Levine & Samet (/6?) allowed subjects to purchase
information from three fallible sources until they could decide which of
eight possible targets was the object of an enemy advance. They found that
information seeking decreased with conflicting and unreliable information,
as did accuracy. On the other hand, Snapper & Peterson (253) reduced
the diagnosticity of information and found people purchasing more. Their
subjects appeared to be unresponsive to changes in information quality be
cause of a policy of purchasing "intermediate" amounts of information.
Another sequential task that has attracted some attention is optional
stopping: the decision maker must choose between accepting a currently
available outcome versus sampling further outcomes that may be of greater
or lesser worth. Although earlier research (see 225o) found that subjects
performed well when options were generated by a random but stationary
process, Brickman (f*f) found very poor performance with options that tended
to increase or decrease in value. In particular, subjects persisted much
longer in sampling options with a descending than with an ascending sequence.
Brickman likened this behavior to "throwing good money after bad." His
subjects' "take the money and run" strategy with ascending series was similar
to that found by Corbin, Olson & Abbondanza (63). Their subjects seem to
have called it quits as soon as an option appeared that was a good bit
better than its predecessors. Slander (2.12), too, described satisficing
(rather than maximizing) principles that may guide subjects' decisions
about searching further.
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Are Important Decisions Biased?
A coherent picture emerges from research described so far. Because
of limited information-processing capacity and ignorance of the rules
for optimal information processing and decision making, people's judgments
are subject to systematic biases. Can these results be generalized from
the lab to the real world?
A number of critics are doubtful. Edwards (80) argued that experimenters,
by denying subjects necessary tools and providing neither the time nor
the guidance to find them, have exaggerated human intellectual limitations.
Winkler & Murphy (30^) criticized laboratory experiments for being overly
simplified and too well structured when compared with the real-world situa
tions they are meant to model. They suggested that people may perform
poorly in the lab because of improper generalization from their real-
world experiences. For example, because real world information tends to
be redundant and unreliable, people may naturally devalue the reliable
information provided in experiments, producing conservatism. In addition,
experimental subjects may be poorly motivated and forced to deal with un
familiar tasks and substantive areas, without adequate training—even in
the meaning of the response mode (tZIa.).
In rebuttal, one could argue that laboratory studies may show subjects
at their best. Use of unfamiliar substantive topics may free them from
preconceived notions that could prejudice their judgments. Provision of
all information necessary for an optimal decision (and little else) is,
as noted by Winkler & Murphy (301), a boon seldom offered by the real
world. It may create demand characteristics forcing subjects toward optimal
responses ( ^O, «?7 , 3o2). An alternative rebuttal is that there are
many real-life situations which are quite like the laboratory, forcing
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people to make a decision without the benefit of training and experience.
People typically buy cars and houses and decide to marry and divorce
under such circumstances, functioning as their own best approximation to
experts.
Perhaps the best way to resolve this argument is to look at the evidence.
EXPERTS IN THE LABORATORY The robustness of biases is shown in formal
experiments using experts as subjects. As examples: Tversky & Kahneman's
(26f) "law of small numbers" results were obtained with statistically
savvy psychologists. Las Vegas casino patrons showed the same irrational
reversals of preferences for gambles as did college students (n6 ,/77 ).
Bankers and stock market experts predicting closing prices for selected
stocks showed substantial overconfidence and performed so poorly that
they would have done better with a "know nothing" strategy (265). Lichten
stein & Fischhoff (11+) found that the probability assessments of psychology
graduate students were no better for questions within their area of expertise
than for questions relating to general knowledge.
The "experts" in these studies were selected on the basis of what they
knew about the subject area, not what they knew about judgment and decision
making (i.e., they were substantive rather than normative experts). Can
normative experts be created in the laboratory by proper training? The
evidence is mixed, suggesting either that some biases are robust or that
we have failed to understand the psychology of our subjects well enough
to assist them.
OUT IN THE FIELD With the exception of some well-calibrated weather
forecasters (described below), similar biases have been found in a variety
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of field studies. For example, Brown, Kahr & Peterson (Vf) observed
overestimation in the probability assessments of military intelligence
analysts. Kidd (I'M) found that engineers for the United Kingdom's Central
Electricity Generating Board consistently underestimated repair time for
inoperative units. Bond (3V-) observed suboptimal play among 53 blackjack
players at four South Lake Tahoe casinos. "By wagering small bets in a
sub-fair game, [these] blackjack gamblers practically guaranteed loss
of their betting capital to the casinos" (p. 413). Flood plain residents
misperceive the probability of floods in ways readily explained in terms
of availability and representativeness (253). Surveying research published
in psychological and educational journals, Cohen (56) and Brewer & Owen (¥3)
found that investigators regularly design experiments with inadequate
statistical power, reflecting a belief in the "law of small numbers" (28*f).
Misinterpretation of regression toward the mean appears to be as endemic
to some areas of psychology (101) as to Kahenman & Tversky's (139) subjects.
A major legal debate concerns the incarceration of individuals for being
"dangerous." What little evidence there is regarding the validity of
dangerousness judgments Indicates substantial "over-prediction," incarcera
tion of people who would not have misbehaved had they been set free (72, 2V2).
Although this bias may reflect a greater aversion to freeing someone who
causes trouble than to erring in the other direction, some observers have
attributed it to judgmental problems such as failure to consider base rates,
ignorance of the problems of predicting rare events, perception of. non-existent
correlations, and insensitivity to the reliability of evidence (198a).
Jurors appear to have great difficulty ignoring first impressions of
the accused's personality, pretrial publicity, an(j other forms of inadmissible
evidence (V6 , 270), tendencies which may represent both hindsight and
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anchoring biases (^2). The vagaries of eyewitness testimony and witnesses'
overconfidence in erroneous knowledge are quite well known (51,180).
Zieve (319) has described at length the misinterpretation and abuse
of laboratory test results by medical clinicians. Although some of these errors
are due to ignorance, others reflect naive statistical reasoning. A
classic case of the "law of small numbers" is Berkson, Magath & Hum's (25)
discovery that aspiring lab technicians were expected by their instructors
to show greater accuracy in performing blood cell counts than was possible
given sampling variation. These instructors would marvel that the best
students (those who would not cheat) had the greatest difficulty in pro
ducing acceptable counts. In a phenomenological study of orthopedic
surgeons, Knafl & Burkett (/55) found a variety of simplifying heuristics,
some of them in the form of general treatment philosophies (e.g., "don't
cut unless you absolutely have to").
The immense decisions facing our society (e.g., nuclear power) have
prompted the development of formal analytic techniques to replace traditional,
error-prone,"seat of the pants" decision making. Fischhoff (91) reviewed
a variety of cost-benefit analyses and risk assessments performed with
these techniques and found them liable to omissions of important consequences
reflecting availability biases. In case studies of policy analyses,
Albert Wohlstetter (311) found that American intelligence analysts
consistently underestimated Soviet missle strength, a bias possibly due to
anchoring. Roberta Wohlstetter's (311a) study of American unpreparedness
at Pearl Harbor found the U.S. Congress and military investigators guilty
of hindsight bias in their judgment of the Pearl Harbor command staff's
negligence.
Even if policy analyses are performed correctly, they still must be
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explained (sold?) to the public. In the area of natural hazard management,
well-founded government policies have foundered because people don't perceive
flood hazards the way policy makers expect them to (253). For example, the
National Flood Insurance Program has had only limited success because the
endangered won't buy the highly subsidized and normatively very attractive
insurance offered them (/60).
THE ULTIMATE TEST "If behavioral decision theory researchers are so smart,
why aren't they rich?"
"They're not in business."
"Then why aren't people who are in business falling over themselves
to utilize their results?"
Well, although psychological research has not swept the world's
decision makers like wildfire, it has kindled some non-negligible interest.
The concern weather forecasters and decision analysts have shown for research
in probability assessment is described elsewhere in this review. The
Department of Defense is developing sophisticated decision aids to
relieve military commanders of the need to integrate information in their
heads (/¥8). U. S. intelligence analysts have shown interest in the use
of Bayesian approaches for processing of intelligence information (7<?<x,/¥7).
Researchers in accounting (\Hr, Footnote 7) have advocated considering infor
mation-processing limits in designing financial reports. The American College
of Radiology has launched a massive "Efficacy Study" to see how radiologists
use the probabilistic information from x-rays. Bettman (2*0, Armstrong,
Kendall & Ross (II) and others have argued that legislation intended to
provide consumers with necessary information (e.g., unit pricing, true interest
Climo, T. A.. Cash flow statements for investors, unpublished, University of
Kent at Canterbury, 1975.
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rates) must consider how those consumers do, in fact, process information.
DECISION AIDS
"What do you do for a living?"
"Study decision making?"
"Then you can help me. I have some big decisions to make."
"Well, actually ..."
That sinking feeling of inadequacy experienced by many of us doing
psychological research in decision making is probably not felt by most
experts in decision analysis, multiattribute utility theory or other deci
sion aiding techniques. Proponents of these approaches have remedies
for what ails you—techniques to help users make better decisions in any
and all circumstances.
Most of these decision aids rely on the principle of divide and conquer,
This "decomposition" approach is a constructive response to the problem
of cognitive overload. The decision aid fractionates the total problem
into a series of structurally-related parts, and the decision maker is
asked to make subjective assessments for only the smallest components.
Such assessments are presumably simpler and more manageable than assessing
more global entities. Research showing that decomposition improves judgment
has been reported by Armstrong, Denniston & Gordon 0°)» Gettys et al (lO*f) >
and by Edwards and his colleagues (25*f> PP» 717-21).
Critics of the decomposition approach would argue that many of the
aids require assessments of quantities the decision maker has never thought
about, and that these apparently simple assessments may be psychologically
more complex than the original decision. In some situations, people may
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really know what they want to do better than they know how to assess the inputs
required for the decision aid.
Decision aids which do not rely on decomposition, but instead require
the decision maker to state preferences among whole, nonfractionated
alternatives, are here called "wholistic." The models in these aids are
used to smooth or correct the wholistic judgments, and to partial them into
components.
Since several of the decision aids rely on assessments of probability,
we start this section with a review of probability elicitation techniques.
Assessing Probabilities
What's the best way to assess probabilities? Spetzler & Stael von
Holstein (260) have written an excellent description of how the Decision
Analysis Group at Stanford Research Institute approaches this problem.
They recommended (a) carefully structuring the problem with the client
("mental acrobatics should be minimized", p. 343), (b) minimizing biases
that might affect the assessor, (c) using personal interviews rather than
computer-interactive techniques with new clients, and (d) using several
different elicitation methods, both direct and indirect. Their favorite
elicitation technique is a reference bet involving a "probability wheel,"
a disk with two differently colored sectors whose relative size is adjustable.
The assessor is offered two bets, each with the same payoff. One bet
concerns the uncertain quantity (you win if next year's sales exceed $X);
the other bet concerns the disk (you win if the pointer lands in the orange
sector after the disk is spun). The relative size of the two sectors is
varied until the assessor is indifferent between the two bets. The proportion
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of the disk which is orange is taken as the probability of the event
stated in the other bet.
Despite the appeal of this method (it is formally justified within
axiomatic models of subjective probability, does not require the assumption
that the utility of money is linear with money, and requires no numerical
response from the assessor), we have been unable to find any research on
its use.
DISCRETE EVENTS Comparisons among several direct methods for assessing
the probabilities of discrete events (probabilities vs. odds vs. log
odds) have failed to identify one clearly preferable response mode (35,
73a, 105). Beach (22) found a mean within-subject correlation of only .49
between probabilities assessed directly and indirectly (via bids for bets).
DuCharme & Donnell (l(o) found equally conservative inferences using odds,
probabilities, and an indirect method similar in concept to, but more
complicated than, the reference bet method discussed by Spetzler & Stael von
Holstein(26o).
These studies focused on the assessment of middle-range probabilities;
even less is known about assessing very large or very small probabilities.
Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein (251) have shown that subjects grossly
misuse odds of greater than 50:1. Selvidge (2HI) has made some common-sense
suggestions for assessing very small probabilities. She advised first
structuring and decomposing the problem, then ranking various unlikely events,
and finally attaching numbers to those events with the help of reference
events (like dying in various rare accidents).
Once you've assessed a probability, how good is it? When there is an
agreed-upon "true probability"—as with bookbag and poker chip tasks—the
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assessed probability may be compared with the "truth." But more often,
the assessed probability states a degree of belief in some proposition,
so that no criterion "true" probability value exists. One test of such
probabilities is coherence, that is, do they abide by the axioms of prob
ability? (V\0, 316). A second kind of validity, called calibration, may
be examined if one collects a large number of assessments for which the
truth of the associated propositions is known. For discrete propositions,
calibration means that for every collection of propositions assigned the
same numerical probability, the hit rate or proportion which actually are
true should be equal to the assessed probability. The research on calibra
tion has recently been extensively reviewed extensively (175), so only a summary
of findings will be given here: (a) Experienced weather forecasters, when
performing their customary tasks, are excellently calibrated. (b) Every
body else stinks. (c) People are overconfident except with very easy
tasks.
UNCERTAIN QUANTITIES The most common technique for assessing probability
density functions across uncertain quantities is the fractile method. An
assessor who names a value of an uncertain quantity as its .25 fractile,
for example, is saying that there is just a 25% chance that the true value
will be smaller than that specified value. Stael von Holstein (26*f) and
Vlek (2^0) have studied the consistency between the fractile method and
other elicitation methods. Stael von Holstein found that even after four
sessions most subjects were inconsistent. Vlek's subjects showed greater
consistency.
Continuous probability density functions can also be tested for
calibration. Assessors are calibrated when, over many such assessments,
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the proportion of true answers falling below a given fractile is equal
to that fractile. The evidence on calibration (/75) may be summarized
as follows: (a) A strong and nearly universal bias exists: the assessed
distributions are too tight, so that from 20% to 50% of the true values,
instead of 2%,rfall outside of the .01 to .99 range of the distributions;
(b) Training improves performance.
SCORING RULES Scoring rules are functions which assign a score to an
assessed probability (or a vector of probabilities) as a function of both
the true outcome of the event being assessed and the size of the probability
associated with the true outcome. Such rules are strictly proper if and
only if the only strategy for maximizing one's expected score is to tell
the truth—to state one's true belief without hedging. Usually the only
rules considered are those which reward expertise: given that one tells
the truth, the more one knows, the larger the score (an exception is Vlek's
£2*11] fair betting game). Scoring rules have recently been discussed by
Murphy £ Winkler (205, 206) and by Shuford & Brown (50 ,2^6).
Scoring rules may be used for three purposes. One use is as an indirect
method for measuring probabilities. A list of bets is generated from
the scoring rule. Each bet gives two numbers, how much the assessor wins
if the event in question occurs and how much is lost if it does not. The
assessor selects his or her preferred bet from the list; this choice implies
a probability. Jensen & Peterson 036) and Seghers, Fryback & Goodman (140)
found this method unsatisfactory; their subjects were apparently using other
strategies rather than trying to maximize winnings.
Secondly, scoring rules may be used to educate assessors about proba
bility assessments made with other methods. Several studies have used
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scoring rule feedback (ZHL, 263, 308) without reporting whether it helped.
Hoffman & Peterson (120) reported that subjects who received such feedback
improved their scores on a subsequent task but Vlek (290) found no such
improvement. Scoring rules are now widely used by weather forecasters,
and this may be why they are so well calibrated (US). Murphy & Winkler
(2©7) reported that a majority of 689 weather forecasters (a) described
themselves as being uncomfortable thinking in probabilistic terms (though
their job is to report probabilities and they do it well) and (b) rejected
the idea that their forecasts can be properly evaluated by a single quanti
tative measure like scoring rule (though many had had experience with
such feedback).
The third use for scoring rules is to evaluate assessors. When all
assessors are working in the same situation, the assessor with the higher
score is the better assessor. However, not all situations are equal; there
is more uncertainty in forecasting rain in Chicago than in Oregon. Thus
Oregon forecasters will earn higher scores simply because of where they
work. Murphy (203) has shown that the Brier scoring rule (the one used
in meteorology) may be partitioned into three additive components, measuring
(a) the inherent uncertainty in the task, (b) the resolution of the assessor
(i.e., the degree to which the assessor can successfully assign probabilities
different from the overall hit rate), and (c) the assessor's calibration.
None of the components is itself a proper scoring rule, but the difference
between the total score and the inherent uncertainty component is proper,
and this difference could be used to compare assessors in different situa
tions (2o+).
The astute reader will note that the research does not provide an
adequate answer to the question asked at the start of this section: What's
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the best way to assess probabilities? In addition, the research has yielded
few theoretical ideas. Only Pitz (21<0 has speculated on the cognitive
processes underlying probabiltiy assessment. Finally, although a few
studies have noted that training improves performance in eliciting proba
bilities, a definitive long-range learning study is still needed.
Multiattribute Utility Theory
Suppose you must choose one object or course*of action from a set.
Each object or action is describable in terms of a number of dimensions
or attributes of value to you, and the outcomes of your choice are certain.
Then multiattribute utility theory (MAUT) prescribes that you compute,
for each object j, the following weighted utilities, summed across the
attributes i:
MAU = £ w.tu.f.s »
where w. is the relative importance of the i'th attribute and u.. is the
1 ij
utility of the j'th object on the i'th attribute. For example, when
choosing a car, w. might be the importance of design, and u..
would indicate how beautifully designed car j is. The theory prescribes
that you choose the car with the largest MAU. While this model is the
most common, variants exist which incorporate additional features such
as uncertainty, multiplicativity (rather than additivity) of the weighted
utilities, time factors, and the possibility tb^at your choice will affect
others (2*3).
MAUT is a decision aid strongly grounded in theory. The
axioms of the theory lead to the models, to methods for measuring the
utilities and weights, and to specified tests which show which of the models
is applicable. MAUT models have been extensively developed in the last
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five years (9H, 95, 9i, /¥/ , /V3, 233, 23*f). If these sources are too
technical, try the review papers by MacCrimmon (18b), Fischer (86» 88)> von
Winterfeldt & Fisher (276), Humphreys (I3l),jand Huber (l2*|a).
ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES The first step in constructing a MAU is to list
the attributes. Techniques for doing this are rarely discussed. Among
those who have faced the problem, some have used the Delphi technique
(e.g., lOZ, 211). Humphreys & Humphreys (13Z) suggested using George
Kelly's repertory grid technique. Dalkey, Lewis & Snyder (65) proposed
evaluating diverse problems (e.g., job choice, modes of transportation)
not on the basis of their apparent attributes but on a common set of
attributes reflecting quality of life (e.g., security, fun, freedom). Beach,
et al (23) described an extensive interviewing technique, involving several
interactions with different decision makers, to arrive at a list of attributes.
It seems obvious that the ommission of an important attribute can
seriously alter the results of a MAUT application. However, Aschenbrenner
& Kasubek (iZ) found reasonably similar results for preferences among
apartments from MAU analyses based on two different, only partially overlapping
sets of attributes.
Weights and utilities can be assessed either directly or indirectly.
Direct approaches, which are simple but not theoretically justified, include
ranking or rating scales, or just asking the assessor for the relevant
numbers. For utilities, the assessor may be presented with graph paper
and asked to sketch a curve. Utility functions may also be derived by
constructing indifference curves for pairs of variables 08*?, J90); these
methods are lengthy, tedious, and clearly impractical when there are many
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variables. After two indifference curves for the same pair of variables
are assessed, a "staircase" method can be used by the analyst to uncover
the utility curves for each of the variables, assuming that the variables
are value independent (see islo, p. 57"61).
Indirect methods are justified within the theory, but are exceedingly
complex. They rely on a comparison between a gamble and a sure thing, and
thus introduce probabilities into an otherwise riskless situation. For
example, to assess the weight of one attribute from a set of 14 attributes
describing apartments (such as number of bedrooms, general cleanliness, etc.),
the analyst says, "Apartment A has the best (most preferred) level of all
14 attributes. Apartment B has the worst level of all 14 attributes. Apart
ment C has the best level on one attribute and the worst level on each of the
other 13. State a probability p such that you are indifferent between
receiving C for sure versus receiving a gamble wherein you will obtain
A with probability p and B with probability (1-p). What is the value of
p that makes you indifferent?" The value of p that you name is the weight;
such a question must be asked for each attribute.
The two indirect methods for assessing utilities are similar to the
indirect method for assessing weights, except that "Apartment C" now has
an intermediate level for one alternative, and the worst level for all others.
In the variable-probability method, as with assessing weights, the task
is to name a probability that makes the sure thing (Apartment C) indifferent
to the gamble. In the fixed-probability method, the gamble's probabilities
are held constant at (1/2, 1/2), and the assessor must name that intermediate
value on one attribute of the sure thing which leads to indifference. In
either case, one answer gives only one point on the utility curve, so that
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several responses are required to estimate its shape, for each attribute.
Kneppreth et al (/56) have written an excellent review of the methods
for assessing utilities, explaining each method in detail, noting advantages
and disadvantages, and referencing relevant research. That research has
been unsystematic and allows no clear conclusions. Perhaps future researchers
should model their work on a study by Vertinsky & Wong (28?). Comparing
an indifference curve method with the indirect fixed-probability method,
they looked at test-retest reliability and a host of other indices, including
the acceptance of particular rationality axioms, realism
of the task, confidence in the method, bias in the interpretation of
probability, and a measure of the width of an indifference band across the
variables. They found that the indirect method was more reliable and easier
for the subjects, while the indifference curve technique predicted more
subsequent choices.
ISSBES In MAUT, two issues are paramount. The first is: Is it valid?
Early research in the use of MAUT frequently involved correlating the results
of the model with unaided wholistic judgments of the same situations
made by the same subjects (e.g., 130, 15Z, Z9*i, and earlier papers referenced
in the reviews mentioned above). A high correlation between the model and
the wholistic judgments, the usual result, was taken as evidence that the
model was valid. This conclusion seems faulty to us. If unaided wholistic
preferences are good enough to constitute criteria for a decision aid like
MAUT, who needs the decision aid? Furthermore, a decade or more of research
has abundantly documented that humans are quite bad at making complex
unaided decisions (2H8); it could thus be argued that high correlations
with such flawed judgments would suggest a lack of validity. More sophisti-
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cated approaches have been taken by Fischer (87), who showed greater
agreement among three different decomposition procedures than
among three different wholistic procedures, and by Newman (208)» who
proposed applying Cronbach's (64) theory of generalizability to t^e problem
of validating MAUT techniques.
But most practitioners and theorists approach the validity question
as follows: the theory specifies the models, the assessment procedures,
and the tests for choosing which model applies. Thus if you accept the
axioms (yes, I do want my choices to be transitive; I should not be swayed
by irrelevant alternatives, etc.) and pass the tests, then you can be assured
that you are doing the right thing. There is no remaining validity question.
The second issue concerns error. Indirect elicitation techniques for
both weights and utilities are, as previously noted, quite complex, but
theoretically justifiable. The direct methods, in contrast, seem easier,
but are theoretically unjustified. If one assumes that the decision maker
has underlying weights, utilities, and preferences, which approach, direct
or indirect, elicits these underlying values with least error? Von Winter-
feldt (Z93) discussed but did not resolve this issue. Practitioners can
(and often do) perform sensitivity analyses (how much can I change this
parameter before the decision changes?). Such sensitivity analyses will
identify where potential problems of measurement exist, but not solve them.
The tests which are used to determine which MAUT model is applicable
are equally complex. The test for additivity uses the weights derived from
the indirect method. If the weights across all the attributes sum to 1.0, an
additive model may be used. Otherwise, a multiplicative model is used.
No error theory is available to tell you whether a sum of, say, 1.4 is
"close enough" to 1.0 to justify an additive model. An alternative, and
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seemingly easier, test is available for additivity (see 2^6, p. 70). Unfor
tunately, no alternatives are available for two other necessary tests.
These tests are for two kinds of utility independence (called "preferential
independence" and "utility independence" by Keeney (1HZ), and "WCUI" and
SCUI" by others [see 2^6]). The following question, with reference to the
location of the Mexico City airport (W2), is just the starting point for
these tests: "How many people seriously injured or killed per year, call
that number x, makes you indifferent between the option: [x injured or
killed and 2500 persons subjected to high noise levels] and the option:
[one person injured or killed and 1,500,000 subjected to high noise
level]?" Several such questions must be asked for each attribute and for
all pairs of attributes. The frequent avoidance of these tests may not
reflect laziness, but a genuine suspicion that using an unjustified model
may lead to fewer errors than choosing a model on the basis of confused
responses to complex questions such as these. As von Winterfeldt (293)
has noted, "even after you go through the process of model elimination and
selection, you will still have to make up your mind about the possible trade
offs between assessment error and modeling error1.' (p. 65).
The flavor of the indirect assessment methods and
the three tests mentioned above may be appreciated by reading 54 pages of
dialogue between an analyst (Keeney) and an expert as they
evaluate alternatives for the production of electrical energy (MH).
RECENT RESEARCH The "new look" in MAUT research is to explore its uses.
Can it be done? What problems are encountered? What can be learned
from applying MAUT? Gardiner & Edwards (I0Z) showed that in a highly
controversial issue (coastal land development) two groups of experts
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(developers and conservationists) showed notably less disagreement about
the evaluation of proposed apartment buildings in their MAUT evaluations
than in their wholistic evaluations. O'Connor (211) reported the difficulties
in getting many experts to agree on evaluations of water quality while
trying to (a) minimize the amount of experts' time needed for the evalua
tion, (b) eliminate redundant or strongly interrelated attributes,
(c) cope with possible non-compensatory factors (if the water is loaded
with arsenic, nothing else matters). Guttentag & Sayeki (HO) used a MAUT
technique to illuminate the cultural differences in values and beliefs
about peace issues between Japanese and Americans. In one of two reports
of real applications (i.e., working with clients who paid for the advice),
Keeney observed the changes in a MAUT system after two years of use (IH5).
In the second report, he described the complexities of^deciding where and
when to build a new airport in Mexico City (IH-Z). Additional proposals
for applications of MAUT, without relevant data, have been made for the
development of social indicators (258), military system effectiveness (297)
and solid waste management (/5o). Finally, computer programs to aid elici
tation of MAUT have been written (W6).
Decision Analysis
The most general approach for systematically evaluating alternative
actions is decision analysis, an approach developed largely at the Harvard
Business School (22/, 235) and two private contract research firms, the
Stanford Research Institute (1Z5), and Decisions and Designs, Inc. (H9). In
facing a new problem, the analyst lists the decision alternatives, constructs
a model of their interrelations, assesses the probabilities of relevant
contingencies, finds out what the decision maker wants and, finally, assays
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the expected value or utility of each alternative. To do this, decision
analysts use a bag of tricks drawn from crafts such as operations research,
Bayesian statistics, SEU and MAUT, which allow the analyst to, "in principle,
address any decision problem with unimpeachable rigor" (*tf, p. 64). A
common tool is the decision tree which diagrams the uncertain consequences
arising from a decision.
Among the problems that have been given full-dress decision analyses
are whether to seed hurricanes in hopes of reducing their intensity (12(e),
how to establish planetary quarantine requirements for trips to Mars and
Jupiter (121), what value nuclear power generating plants have for Mexico
(26/), and how to design export controls on computer sales to the Soviet
Bloc (II)} Many environmental impact statements, cost-benefit analyses
and risk assessments constitute variants on decision analytic-methodology
(55, 91, 198, 2/6).
Although many of these analyses are already highly sophisticated, the
basic methodology is still developing—often in response to specific
problems. Work in the last five years has increased our ability to evaluate
decision trees efficiently (288), assess the value of decision flexibility
(19+), and understand how models approximate the processes they are intended
to describe (276).
Some awareness of psychological issues can be found in decision analysis,
One example attempts to use the best psychological scaling techniques
for eliciting probability judgments (260)* Another emphasizes
communicating effectively with decision makers; the analyst is encouraged
to develop a role "not too dissimilar to that of a psychoanalyst" (^Yj*P» 9).
Brown (^8) raised a cognitive problem that warrants further examination.
45
He noted that decision analyses often fail to model responses to future
events. As a result, when those future events actually occur, they are
responded to in totally unanticipated ways, because in the flesh they look
different than they did at the time of the analysis.
Man/Machine Systems
For years, one of the most promising areas in decision aiding has been
the development of computerized aids for helping decision makers cope
with complex problems. Systems designed to elicit MAUT appraisals fall
into this category, as do the approaches described below.
REGRESSION APPROACHES Research within the regression paradigm has shown
that people have difficulty both applying the judgmental policies they wish
to implement and describing the policies they actually are implementing.
Hammond and colleagues have developed computer-graphics systems to combat
both of these problems (/13a, //7). Since these techniques can describe
the policies of several participants in a given situation, they have been
used to resolve interpersonal and intergroup conflicts (3*?) and to
facilitate policy formation at the societal level (2, tlC>).
Another major decision-aiding technique is bootstrapping, which replaces
judges with algebraic models of their own weighting policies. Recent re
search has continued to demonstrate that these models perform as well as or
better than the judges themselves (lH, 68, 111, 2oZ, 237, 5o7) • Additional
work promises to further enhance bootstrapping's usefulness. Einhorn (Qlj 92)
showed how expert judgment and statistical techniques can incorporate
poorly defined and hard to measure variables into judges' models. Dawes &
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Corrigan CJo) demonstrated that in most situations the criterion being judged
could be predicted well by models with unit weights (see also S3, 29f).
These unit-weighting results suggest that in many decision settings, all
the judge needs to know is what variables to throw into the equation, which
direction (4- or -) to weight them, and how to add. Actually, Benjamin
Franklin had this insight about unit weighted linear models back in 1772
(/86, p. 27).
PIP One of the earliest proposals for sharing the decision-making load
between the machine and the decision maker was (H) the Probabilistic
Information Processing System (PIP). In situations where judges must
revise their probabilities upon receipt of new information, the PIP
system accepts the judges' subjective assessments of prior probabilities,
and of the probability of each datum conditional on each hypothesis, and
then aggregates them according to Bayes' theorem in order to produce
posterior probabilities of the hypotheses. A review in 1971 (25V) revealed
an abundance of research on PIP; since then, however, the flood has receded.
A few recent studies have discussed what to do when the data are not condi
tionally independent of one another and have examined how well subjects
handle such data (.7*+, tZ9, 266). A couple of interesting medical applica
tions have been proposed (108,101).
DYNAMIC SYSTEMS Some of the most ambitious interactive man/machine systems
have been developed to handle dynamic decision-making situations. The
problems studied by researchers in this area are extremely varied and the
systems developed to solve them tend to be highly specific. However,
a pattern of conceptualizing the task, developing the mathematics and soft-
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ware to handle it, and then validating the system in one or a series of
experiments is common. As an example, a team at Perceptronics, Inc.
has developed a highly sophisticated system to assist naval officers
tracking "the elements of a simulated fishing fleet [one trawler and one
iceberg] as it moves about in an expanse of ocean" (a task that vaguely
resembles a futuristic version of Battleships) (^7, f* 3-1). The system
tracks the decision maker's responses continuously and uses utilities
inferred from them to recommend maximum expected utility decisions (fB).
From an experiment testing the system with 12 Naval Reserve NCO's during
four 90-minute sessions, Davis et al (67) concluded that it worked in
realistic decision-making situations, was accepted by experienced opera
tors, and markedly improved performance.
Such systems may be designed either as products that will actually
wukk in some field situation or as research tools. Perhaps because of
their expense, most products have been designed to solve specific military
problems with no civilian analog (although readers concerned about .
the possible presence of Soviet frogpersons in their bathtub or swim
ming pool might want to consult Irving [/33]). It is difficult for the
non-expert to judge the validity of these systems and the acceptability
of their advice.
With systems designed for research purposes, a critical issue is the
tradeoff between realism and generality. One strategy is to design
systems whose complexity begins to approach that found in the real world—
at the risk of investing too much of available resources in the machine
and too little in understanding how people use it. Some human factors
questions worth studying are (a) how do variations in the basic system (e.g.,
different instructions or information displays) affect people's perfor-
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mance? (b) how do person and machine errors interact? (c) how should machine
output be adjusted to different decision makers* cognitive styles and work
paces (110, 111 )? and (d) when do people heed the machine's advice (/// , //£)?
Another problem with these systems is that their very complexity makes
it difficult to compare results from one research context to the next.
Perhaps the only way to do that is to interpret the results in terms of
basic psychological (judgmental) phenomena. If that tack is taken, then
one might ask whether the development of general behavioral principles would
not be served best by using a number of simpler, cheaper and more flexible
systems, such as the tactical and negotiations game used by the Streuferts
and colleagues (e.g.,26^). Research showing why man/machine systems should
be adopted might provide a more convincing case than the demonstration in
a complex simulation that decision makers do better with the machine's help.
The skeptic may argue that such demonstrations merely show that one can
design a simulated task in which it helps to have machine assistance.
Using Decision Aids
Do decision makers use these sophisticated techniques? Bootstrapping
is now being applied for a variety of repeated decisions. On the other
hand, apparently few, if any, PIP systems are operational today despite
the mass of research refining its methodology. For most aids, a clear
picture is hard to come by. In the scientific literature one can find
demonstration projects showing a procedure's viability. However, when a
technique passes the test of getting someone to pay for it, the result
typically becomes proprietary. For reasons of national or industrial
security, the details of such projects are not divulged, nor are the decision
makers' responses to them. Most overviews by those in the decision aiding
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business understandably tend to be quite optimistic.
Brown (47* *49), however, has presented an insightful discussion of
factors that may limit decision makers' receptiveness to decision analysis
and presumably to other techniques as well. One is the fact that decision
makers often employ an analyst to reduce the uncertainty in a problem situ
ation, not to acknowledge and quantify it. Another source of resistance
is the absence of top-level decision makers familiar with the technique*
a third is the bad experiences of decision makers who try to solo on the
technique without proper training. Brown, Kahr & Peterson (*+9) suggested
that decision analysis is a clinical skill that should only be practiced
after internship with an expert.
Another problem is that decision makers may, even after careful
coaching, reject the basic conception (e.g., the axioms) on which the aids
are based. Protocols of conversations between analysts and decision makers
leave the impression that decision makers are under considerable pressure
to adopt the analyst's perspective. It is debatable whether satisfaction
with the results of such an analysis show that the analyst has really answered
the decision maker's needs. Conrath (58) and Reeser (227) found that
decision makers reject decision analysis (and related techniques) for being
overly complicated and divorced from reality. Individuals who may accept the
assumptions of such analysis may still reject their logical implications
if they are unintuitive or too difficult to explain and justify to others.
A problem discussed earlier is whether decision makers can provide
the required probability, utility and modeling judgments. Because of the
vagaries of such judgments, the decision aider runs the risk of grinding
through highly sophisticated analyses on inputs of very little value.
Certainly "garbage in—garbage out" applies to decision aiding—with
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the particular danger that undue respect may be given to garbage produced
by high-powered and expensive grinding. Relatively little is known about
the sensitivity of decision aids to errors in elicitation and problem
structuring. Von Winterfeldt & Edwards (2^V«) have proven that under
very general conditions probability and utility estimates can be somewhat
inaccurate without leading to appreciably suboptimal decisions. Their proof
is applicable to the case where decision options are continuous (e.g.,
invest X dollars). However, Lichtenstein, Fischhoff & Phillips (115)
have shown how a moderate error in probability estimation can lead to
a substantial decrease in expected utility when the decision options are
discrete (e.g., operate vs. don't operate). Von Winterfeldt & Edwards (295)
have identified a large class of errors which can lead to large expected
losses and are extremely difficult to detect. They arise from the selec
tion of dominated decision alternatives as the result of inappropriately
modeling the decision problem.
How much is a decision aid worth? This difficult question is typically
answered with arguments why aids should, in principle,: be worth the resources
invested in them. Recently, Watson & Brown (3o3) provided enlightenment
with a formal model for performing a decision analysis of a decision analysis.
The model is accompanied by three case studies ($fl*f) that highlight the
difficulties of performing a hindsightful analysis. Ironically, the
greatest value of two of these analyses came from their contribution to
organizational processes (reduction of controversy and improvement of communi
cation), considerations that were left out of the formal model for the sake
of simplicity.
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CONCLUSION
One reason for the vitality of the research described here is the
increased importance of deliberative decision making in our daily lives.
In a non-traditional society individuals must rely on their analytical
resources rather than habit in guiding their affairs. A rapidly changing
and interrelated world cannot allow itself the luxury of trial and error
as it attempts to cope with problems like nuclear power and natural hazard
management. Economists, engineers, operations researchers, decision analysts
and others are developing sophisticated procedures for these problems. It
is our job as psychologists to remind them of the human component in imple
menting these techniques and explaining their conclusions to the public—
in particular to point out the errors that may arise from judgmental biases.
We must help the public to make its private decisions and to develop a critical
perspective on those decisions made in its behalf.
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